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INTRODUCTION
Citizens outside of the bureaucracy often perceive a
maze of lawyers and suspect that all government
employees are in cahoots with one another. This
sentiment is particularly prevalent where the hearing
official works directly within the agency. In these cases,
the agency's control structure makes ethics walls
particularly important, because no apparent
organizational barrier exists.'
In May of 2008, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued a
complaint challenging Inova Health System Foundation's proposed
acquisition of Prince William Health System.2 What surprised many
was that the FTC did not appoint one of the independent
administrative law judges ("ALJs") assigned to the FTC to oversee
adjudications, but instead appointed one of its own heads,
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, to serve as ALJ over the matter.3
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which governs all
administrative agencies, including the FTC, permits an agency to
either assign one of the independent ALJs, or one of its own heads,
that is, a commissioner, to adjudicate a matter.4 The latter, however,
has rarely occurred.'
Rosch's appointment as ALJ was followed by criticism that the
FTC was rigging the case to turn out in its favor.6 One basis for this
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (2010); B.A., William Smith
College (2004).
' Jeff Bush & Kristal Wiitala Knutson, The Building and Maintenance of
"Ethics Walls" in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 24 J. NAT'L Ass'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 8 (2004).
2 Complaint, In re Inova Health Sys. Found. (FTC dismissed June 17, 2008)
(No. 9326), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9326/080509admincomplaint.pdf
3 See Order Designating Administrative Law Judge, In re Inova Health Sys.
Found. (FTC dismissed June 17, 2008) (No. 9326), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9326/080509admincomplaint.pdf.
4 See infra note 48.
s See infra note 55.
6 See infra note 56.
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concern was that as a Commissioner, Rosch had engaged in ex parte
discussions with the parties regarding the merits of the case.7 The
APA clearly permits the FTC to appoint one of its own
commissioners to act as ALJ in a matter.' Doing so, however, also
enables the agency to circumvent safeguards in the APA that were
established to ensure that administrative hearings, much like those in
typical judicial courts, would be in front of an independent and
impartial decision-maker. 9 Establishing an ALJ code of ethics would
alleviate these concerns, protect agencies from public criticism and
accusations of trial rigging, and also maintain public confidence in
the administrative state.
Part I will provide background information on the administrative
processes of the FTC. Part II addresses the background, intents, and
purposes of the APA. Part III discusses judicial ethics and codes of
conduct that are relevant to the administrative system. Part IV
explains the benefits an ALJ code of conduct would provide to
maintaining public confidence in the administrative state. In
conclusion, a code of judicial ethics for ALJs would alleviate
concerns and criticisms that were generated by the provisions of the
APA, and were most recently highlighted by the actions of the FTC
in appointing an agency head as ALJ.
I.ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AT THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
To appreciate why assigning an FTC commissioner to act as an
ALJ over a matter raises ethical concerns, one must understand the
agency's processes. Established in 1914, the FTC is an independent
executive regulatory agency that enforces the antitrust laws through
investigations, rulemaking, and administrative adjudication.o Parties
contemplating mergers or acquisitions of certain size thresholds are
required by statute to report the proposed transaction to the
Commission and gain approval prior to consummating the deal."
See infra note 95.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)-(1) (2006).
9 See infra note 49.
o ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 73,
75-76 (Foundation Press 5th ed. 2003).
" Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
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Once a proposed transaction is reported, the FTC may decide to
investigate further in order to determine whether the merger poses
anticompetitive issues. 12 Following an investigation, FTC staff may
recommend that the Commission challenge the proposed transaction
by issuing a complaint.' 3 The staffs recommendation memo will
analyze the evidence collected and evaluate the likelihood of
succeeding in adjudication.14 At this stage, the parties to the
transaction will typically meet with the commissioners individually
and attempt to persuade each to vote against challenging the
transaction.' 5 Additionally, the parties may wish to provide white
papers addressing potential competitive concerns. 16
Once the parties have had the opportunity to meet with each
commissioner, the commissioners will hold a meeting-which is
closed to the parties-in which they discuss with the investigating
staff whether to issue a complaint.' 7 A majority of the commissioners
will vote to challenge a proposed merger if they determine that there
is sufficient evidence to believe that the antitrust laws will be
violated by the transaction. In a merger situation, the
commissioners will then authorize staff to seek a preliminary
injunction in federal court to prevent the merger from being
consummated until a full case on the merits can be adjudicated at the
FTC before an ALJ.19 Standard procedure is for the FTC to assign the
12 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FEDERAL MERGER REVIEW at 25 (Judy Whalley ed.)
(1995) [hereinafter MERGER REVIEW GUIDE].
13 See id. at 28.
14 Id. at 27.
15 Id. at 28, 224. A majority is needed to challenge a proposed transaction. Id.
at 28.6 Id. at 221-22, 224.
17 Id. at 226.
8 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006).
19 MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 12, at 28-29. Typical procedure is for
the FTC to issue an administrative complaint and immediately seek a preliminary
injunction in district court. See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission,
FTC Launches Suit to Block Merger of CC and Mitchell (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/11/cccmitchell.shtm; compare Complaint, In re CCC
Holdings Inc. (Nov. 25, 2008) (No. 9326), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9334/081125cccmitchelladmincmpt.pdf, with
Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Pursuant
matter for adjudication by one of the independent ALJs appointed by
the Office of Personnel Management and detailed to the agency. 20
The decision of the ALJ is then subject to appeal in front of the
commissioners.21
As an administrative agency, the procedures of the FTC were
developed under the rubric of the APA. The APA grants FTC
commissioners dual prosecutorial and adjudicative roles in
determining whether mergers pose antitrust concerns -
commissioners must make the decision to prosecute by issuing a
complaint, and then later pass final judgment on the merits of the
alleged violation after an initial decision by the ALJ.22 This fusion of
functions poses a problem for many. The American Bar Association's
Section of Antitrust Law has noted that "[n]o thoughtful observer is
entirely comfortable with the FTC's (or other agencies') combining of
prosecutory and adjudicatory functions. Whenever the same people
who issued a complaint later decide whether it should be dismissed,
concern about at least the appearance of fairness is inevitable." 23
Concerns raised by this comingling of functions are typically relieved
by the presence of the independent ALJ, the only individual in the
entire process who is not an employee of the FTC. Further, even
though the commissioners have the power to make the ultimate
decision after reviewing the AL's determination, the commissioners
typically will not have to revisit the case for years while it works its
to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc.
and Aurora Equity Partners, III L.P., No. 1:08-cv02043 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2008)
(demonstrating that the preliminary injunction petition was filed the day after the
administrative complaint issued).
20 The FTC's website notes that ALJs are "independent decision makers"
appointed by the Office of Personnel Management who perform "initial
adjudicative fact-finding in Commission administrative complaint proceedings."
Federal Trade Commission, About the Office of Administrative Law Judges,
http://ftc.gov/ftc/alj.shtm (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
21 PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 76.
22 See PITOFKSY ET AL., supra note 10, at 76.
23 Kirkpatrick Committee, Report of the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade
Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 119 (1989). The Kirkpatrick Committee
consisted of a former FTC Chairman, private lawyers, academics, and others. Id. at
58.
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way through trial in front of the AU. 24 The implication is that they
will essentially review the case anew, the specifics of the case long
forgotten since the time the complaint was issued. Alternatively,
changes in the law or market conditions over that extended period
may guide commissioners who initially supported a complaint to
alter their position.25 These typical rationalizations for mixing
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are absent, however, when
an agency opts to appoint one of its own commissioners to serve as
ALJ. The FTC deviated from standard procedure in appointing
Commissioner Rosch to serve as ALJ In re Inova Health Systems
("Inova"),26 thereby removing the one independent decision-maker
from the process.
The ethical concerns raised by assigning a commissioner as ALJ
are further magnified given the circumstances under which the
Commission decided to appoint Rosch. First, the FTC was on a
losing streak; it had lost all of its most recent cases in federal court.27
Secondly, the independent ALJs had also ruled against the FTC in
several recent administrative matters.28 Lastly, the Inova matter was a
proposed hospital merger - a subject area in which the FTC has a
24 See Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures
and Courts - Except When They're Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 79, 105 (2007).
25 Kirkpatrick Committee, Report of the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade
Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 119 (1989).
26 See infra note 55.
27 See Deborah L. Feinstein, Recent Trends in US. Merger Enforcement:
Down But Not Out, 21 ANTITRUST 74 (2007) (discussing the Commission's recent
losses in FTC v. Equitable Resources and FTC v. Western Ref, Inc.); Carrie
Johnson, Whole Foods'Acquisition Clears Antitrust Hurdle, WASH. POsT, Aug. 17,
2007, at DO.
28 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, ALJ Issues Initial Decision
Dismissing Complaint Against Michigan Realtors' Group (Dec. 13, 2007),
www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/alj/shtm; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission,
Initial Decision Released in Rambus Case (Fed. 24, 2004),
www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/rambusid.shtm; Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission, Administrative Law Judge Dismisses Complaint Against Unocal for
Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Related to Card Gasoline (Nov. 26, 2003),
www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/1 1/unionoil.shtm; Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission, Administrative Law Judge Dismisses FTC Allegations of
Anticompetitive Conduct by Schering-plough and Upsher-Smith (July 2, 2002),
www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/schering.shtm.
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particularly bad record.29 In assigning Commissioner Rosch to be
ALJ, the public was given the impression that the FTC was doing all
it could to ensure a win this time around, at the expense of a fair and
impartial hearing for the parties. Significantly, the APA explicitly
permits the FTC to take this course of action.
II. ADJUDICATION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The APA was created as a direct reaction to the economic and
social damages caused by the Great Depression.30 The government
expanded the breadth and depth of the administrative state in order to
assert greater control, via administrative agencies, over the
economy.3' The speed with which the administrative system grew
alarmed many Americans, 32 and the response to this concern was
passage of the APA.33 The APA was drafted to give structure to the
many powers that had been delegated to administrative agencies,
including the powers of investigation, prosecution, and
adjudication. 34 From the drafting stages of the APA, the comingling
of these functions within a single entity has been critiqued as counter
to the separation of powers doctrine.
The administrative state has been labeled the "headless fourth
branch of the Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible
agencies and uncoordinated powers."" President Franklin
29 See, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999);
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71, 863 (6th Cir.
1997); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 69 F.3d
260 (8th Cir. 1995).
30 W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law Judges, Judicial Independence,
and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 20 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 95, 95-96 (2000).
31 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557, 1561-62 (1996).
32 KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM 177 (West Publishing Co. 1982).
" See id.
34 See id.; Philip Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, 74 YALE L.J.
652 (1965).
3 Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and
Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 429, 450 (2006) (quoting The President's
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Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management (1937) noted
that under the administrative system, "[t]he same men are obliged to
serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines
judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness." 36 In
1938, the American Bar Association's Committee on Administrative
Law went so far as to compare the administrative system with Soviet
dictatorship due to its broad, centralizing powers.3 7 Roosevelt's
Committee recommended a complete division within an agency of
judicial and investigative/prosecutory functions. 38 Members of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure also
advocated for a separation of functions, concerned that "investigators,
if allowed to participate [in adjudication], would be likely to
interpolate facts and information discovered by them ex parte and not
adduced at the hearing, where the testimony is sworn and subject to
cross-examination and rebuttal." 39 Congress' final version of the
APA, however, opted against such a divide.
While Congress acknowledged that the commingling of
investigative, prosecutory, and adjudicative functions was "plainly
undesirable," it concluded that an adequate solution would be an
"internal division of labor" between investigators and prosecutors on
the one hand, and adjudicators on the other.40 The APA, therefore,
provides for an internal separation, within the agency, of adjudicative
and investigative/prosecutory functions, by prohibiting an agency
official involved in the investigation or prosecution of a matter from
Comm. on Admin. Mgmt, Report of the Committee with Studies of Administrative
Management in the Federal Government 40 (1937)).
36 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 9TH CONG., ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONG., S. Doc. No. 248, at 241-42
(Comm. Print 1946) [hereinafter APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (quoting
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL STUDIES
40 (1937)).
37 Jeffrey A. Wertkin, A Return to First Principles: Rethinking ALJ
Compromises, 22 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 365, 385 (2002) (quoting
Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 1938 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
343 (1938)).
3 8 APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 242.
3 9 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 1st
Sess., at 56 (1941) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT].40 APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 24-25.
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also adjudicating the matter as an ALJ.4 1 The APA established
further safeguards to ensure a degree of ALJ independence from the
agency so that the ALJ would be able to freely make decisions and
not be under the thumb of the agency. For example: agencies must
assign ALJs in rotation 42 to "prevent[] an agency from disfavoring [a
particular ALJ] by rendering him inactive,"43 ALJ compensation is
outside of agency control," and ALJs are exempt from agency
performance evaluation and removal.45 In Butz v. Economou, the
Supreme Court noted that administrative adjudication is "structured
so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent
judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the
parties or other officials within the agency." 46
Though the APA includes these provisions to guard ALJ
independence from agency control, it simultaneously grants agencies
the means for asserting control over adjudicative outcomes. For
example, ALJ judgments are only initial decisions, subject to review
by the agency itself.47 Further, the agency can altogether avoid ALJ
protections in the APA by appointing one of its own agency heads to
serve as ALJ in a case,48 as was effectively done by the FTC in
appointing Commissioner Rosch. This exception creates a loophole
through which agency heads can avoid the safeguards contemplated
by the drafters of the APA for typical ALJs - most importantly, the
separation of investigative/prosecutory and adjudicatory functions.49
4'See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006).
42 Id. at § 3105.
43 APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 280.
4 The Office of Personal Management establishes ALJ compensation. See
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2006).
45 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 4301(2) (noting that ALJs are
not employees of the agency), 4302, 4303 (2006).
46 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
47 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006).
48 Id. at § 556(b) (the agency, i.e., commissioners, may oversee an
administrative hearing); Id. at § 554(d)(2) (noting that agency heads are not subject
to restrictions on performing investigative/prosecutory functions and
decisionmaking).
49 Id. at § 554(d)(2) (2006). Section 554(d)(2) provides: "An employee or
agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an
agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in
the decision, recommended decision, or agency review," but this does not apply "to
157Spring 2011 Closing an Administrative Loophole
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In the APA, Congress has created a role for ALJs that is
simultaneously independent from and subservient to, the agency to
which the ALJ is assigned; thereby leading to a confusing existence
for the ALJ and agency adjudication. Moreover, ALJs, and the
administrative trials over which they preside, are created by
Congressional delegation, which means that although ALJs perform
many of the functions of traditional judges within the judicial
branch,o they lie outside of the ethical regulations of the American
Bar Association's Model Code ofJudicial Conduct ("Model Code").
The problem created by this situation can be summarized by the
famous Latin quotation: Qui custodiet ipsos custodes? - who shall
watch the watchers? 52  In other words, who shall oversee
administrative agencies, and serve as a check on their power? A code
of ethics for ALJs would provide such a check, help ensure fairness
in the administrative process, and prevent agency abuse of power in
administrative adjudication. If the FTC had to follow standard
judicial ethics, Rosch likely would not have been appointed ALJ in
the Inova matter. Additionally, an enforceable code of ethics would
assure the public that the FTC was not behaving unfairly.
III. AN ETHICAL CODE FOR ALJs
Since the APA was passed, the breadth of the administrative state
has further increased, becoming indispensible to American
governance.53 This is precisely why the public must continue to have
the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency." Id. at §
554(d)(2)(C).
50 See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513 (holding that ALJs are entitled to the same judicial
immunity as Article III judges because the administrative adjudicative process
"shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process."). Also, in 1972, the
Civil Service Commission changed the title of ALJs from "hearing examiner" to
"administrative law judge," the implication was clear: the role of ALJs was "not
solely to hear or examine, but also to judge" like Article III judges. See Karen S.
Lewis, Administrative Law Judges and the Code of Judicial Conduct: A Need for
Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK. L. REv. 929, 930, 940 (1990).
5 Lewis, supra note 50, at 929-30, 936.
52 See Gillette, supra note 30, at 99.
1 For example, "[i]n 2001, Congress passed 24 major statutes and 112 other
public laws. By contrast, in that year, cabinet departments, the Executive Office of
the President, and independent agencies promulgated 70 significant rules and 3,383
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confidence in the system. The ethical safeguards provided for by the
APA that protect AU independence and impartiality do not apply
when an agency appoints one of its own agency heads to the role of
AU, 54 as the FTC did in appointing Commissioner Rosch. The result
of this departure from precedent" has been a blow to the public's
confidence in the activities of the Commission." Absent
Congressional amendment of the APA that would prohibit an agency
official from investigating, prosecuting, and then making the initial
adjudicative decision in a matter, this poses a major problem for
observers who value separation of powers, adjudicative fairness, and
transparency. Therefore, all ALJs should be subject to ethical
obligations that would limit the fusion of these functions.
Specifically, ALJs should uphold the ethical obligations of fairness,
other rules." Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles ofRulemaking: An Empirical
Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 892 (2008)
(footnotes omitted). See also Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?,
86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1131 (2006) (showing that adjudicative proceedings have
shifted from courts to administrative agencies by noting that more than 500,000
evidentiary proceedings took place in a mere four federal agencies (Social Security
Administration, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and Department of Veterans' Affairs) in 2001); Morrison,
supra note 24, at 101 (comparing the number of cases in front of the Federal
District Courts in 2005 with those in front of the National Labor Relations Board:
in the 92 U.S. District Courts, 322,848 civil cases were filed, 338,314 terminated,
and a trial was held in 5,294; the NLRB alone received 24,720 unfair labor practice
charges, and filed 1,373 complaints, "if all the NLRB cases set for hearing were
tried, that would constitute more than 25% of all federal civil trials - and this is just
from one agency .. . ").
54 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2006).
5 See, e.g., Robert C. Jones & Aimee E. DeFilippo, FTC Hospital Merger
Challenges: Is a "Fast-Track" Administrative Trial the Answer to the FTC's
Federal Court Woes?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2008, at 11-12, available at
www.antitrustsource.com ("The Inova case represented the first time the FTC has
taken the extraordinary step of designating a sitting Commissioner as the presiding
ALJ in an FTC administrative proceeding."); Steven C. Sunshine & John R.
Seward, FTC Tactics Could Complicate Health Care Mergers, NAT'L L. J., Aug.
11, 2008 ("[FTC] took the highly unusual step of appointing Rosch as the AL").
56 See, e.g., Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Antitrust Trade and Practice:
The 'Worst' and the 'Best Antitrust Persons in the World,' N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 2008,
at col. 1 ("The gold-medal winner of our 'Worst Antitrust Person in the World,' by
a huge margin, is the Federal Trade Commission. Within a period of three months,
not once but twice, in order to preempt the judiciary's involvement in a challenged
merger, the commission appointed itself as the administrative law judge .... ").
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impartiality, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety, so that the
public may continue to have confidence in the administrative state. A
code of ethics would assure the public that ALJs were deciding issues
independently and ethically.
The ABA recently acknowledged that ALJs should be included
amongst judicial branch judges and governed by the Model Code.
ALJs had been excluded from the definition of "judges" in the
original 1990 Model Code." In 2007, the ABA amended the Model
Code to explicitly include ALJs. 59 The rationale for this modification
was what others had long noted: ALJs "perform essentially the same
function" as judicial branch judges.60 However, individual
jurisdictions have the discretion to decide whether to adopt the Model
Code for its ALJs, 6 1 which several states have recently done. 62 The
inclusion of ALJs within the Model Code and initial adoption by
several states points to a growing consensus that the status quo can
no longer stand - ALJs are too similar to Article III judges and
should therefore be subject to a judicial code of ethics. The specific
5 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT application I(B) (2007)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE] (noting that members of the "administrative law
judiciary" are now included within the meaning of "judge" under the Model Code).
5 See MODEL CODE (1990) application A, 25 n3, 25-26; REPORTER'S
EXPLANATION OF CHANGES 4, available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/approvedMCJC.html (nothing that "[t]he
most significant substantive change [to the 1990 Model Code] brings within the
definition of 'judges' . . . 'members of the administrative law judiciary"').
5 MODEL CODE application I(B); MODEL CODE, Reporter's Explanation of
Changes at 4, available at
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/ABA2007modelcodeasapproved.pdf.
60 MODEL CODE, Reporter's Explanation of Changes at 14, available at
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/ABA2007modelcodeasapproved.pdf.
61 MODEL CODE application I(B) n. 1 (noting that members of the
"administrative law judiciary" are now included within the meaning of "judge"
under the Model Code, but that "[e]ach jurisdiction should consider the
characteristics of particular positions within the administrative law judiciary in
adopting, adapting, applying, and enforcing the Code for the administrative law
judiciary"). Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that the ABA's Model Code is not
binding on Social Security Administration ALJs because the SSA had not adopted
the Code. Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2003).
62 The states that have adopted model codes include Louisiana, Maryland, New
Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas. Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Accountability in the
Administrative Law Judiciary: The Right and Wrong Kind, 86 DENY. U. L. REv.
157, 168 n.50 (2008).
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rules that are important for maintaining public confidence in the
administrative adjudicative system focus on preserving the mainstays
of the American legal system: judicial independence, fairness, and
impartiality.63
The first important group of rules regards the independence of
judges in making adjudicative decisions. The Model Code states that
judges "should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest
possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality,
integrity, and competence."' Canons 1 and 2 of the Model Code aim
to guide judges in accomplishing these goals.
Canon 1 focuses on a judge's obligation to always act and appear
independent and impartial: "A judge shall uphold and promote the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."65 As the
comments to the Rule state, the test for the appearance of impropriety
is "whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge . . . engaged in . . . conduct that reflects
adversely on the judge's . . . impartiality." 6 6 Decisional independence
rests on granting judges the ability to uphold the rule of law without
coercion or intimidation that "could cause judges to disregard the law
and implement the preferences of those who threaten or control
them." 67 Canon 1 essentially recognizes that for the rule of law to be
credible, the decision-maker must be neutral and free from even the
appearance of outside influence.
Independence is also the central principle embodied by Canon 2,
which mandates that judges impartially carry out their duties.68
Judges must recuse themselves when "impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." 69 A judge must recuse himself when he has "personal
knowledge of facts that are in dispute"70 or "lacks actual knowledge
63 MODEL CODE pmbl. (1).
64 MODEL CODE pmbl. (2).
65 MODEL CODE Canon 1.
66 MODEL CODE R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
67 Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It
Matters For Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1259, 1259-60
(2008).
68 MODEL CODE Canon 2.
6' MODEL CODE R. 2.11(A).
70 MODEL CODE R. 2.11(A)(1).
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of the facts . . . [but] a reasonable person, knowing all the
circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual
knowledge."" To this end, ex parte communications between the
judge and a party are explicitly prohibited.72 An ex parte
communication occurs "between counsel and the court when
opposing counsel is not present."73 The prohibition "is aimed at
averting external influence upon the decision-maker without all
parties being present,"74 given that "contemporaneous opportunities
to be heard in response to an opposing party's factual and legal
assertions" is a fundamental tenet of a fair trial.75 Without the
presence of opposing counsel to rebut allegations, the judge may hear
information that would not be allowed in the courtroom and/or the
judge's impartiality may be tainted.
The Model Code's focus on maintaining judicial independence
and avoiding even the appearance of impropriety are intended to
preserve public confidence in the adjudicative system. In a
democracy, a "government of the people, by the people, and for the
people rises or falls with the will and consent of the governed" and
"[t]he public will not support institutions in which they have no
confidence."7 6 Provisions in the APA largely alleviate the concerns
that the Model Code addresses, at least when an independent ALJ is
assigned to adjudicate a case. The APA's allowance of agencies to
appoint one of their own heads to serve as ALJ, however, removes
these safeguards.7 8 Therefore, in order to maintain public confidence
in the administrative system, ALJs should be subject to the ethical
obligations of the Model Code.
n Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61
(1988).
72 MODEL CODE R. 2.9(A).
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
74 Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in
Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D. L. REv. 551, 565 (1991).
" James E. Molitemo, The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1191, 1201 (2006).
7 ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, Justice in Jeopardy, at 10
(July 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf.
7 7 See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
7 8See supra text accompanying note 49.
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IV. THE ETHICAL ISSUES OF APPOINTING AN AGENCY HEAD AS ALJ:
THE FTC EXAMPLE
The Inova matter illustrates the need to apply ethical standards to
ALJs, particularly agency-head ALJs. An agency head acting as ALJ
inherently heightens concerns of adjudicator independence and
impartiality; not only is the head an employee of the agency (as
opposed to independent ALJs), but also presumably has a vested
interest in the outcomes of cases the Commission votes to pursue. To
complicate things further, agency heads are likely to have had ex
parte communications with the parties,79 which threaten impartiality
and fairness to the parties. The standard argument legitimizing ALJs
within the administrative system - that ALJs "stand between the
agency and the person . .. to provide a fair and impartial hearing"80
will not hold when the AU is an individual who is in charge of the
agency.
Congress included clear provisions in the APA to give ALJs a
certain level of independence from the employing agency by
"deliberately limit[ing] agencies' authority [over an ALJ] in order to
ensure that . . . ALJs would exercise the fullest possible independent
judgment."8 ALJ decisions are very influential in the agency's final
determination, as "most [ALJ] rulings are given considerable weight
by the agency and become final agency decisions," and "[siince the
presiding ALJ controls discovery, the admissibility of evidence, and
the conduct of the hearing, he directly affects the record upon which
the ultimate agency decision will be based." 82 The APA loophole
permitting agency heads to conduct administrative adjudications
appears to enable agencies to circumvent the procedures established
to maintain independence in administrative adjudications. Despite the
fact that initial ALJ decisions are subject to agency review anyway, 83
79 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
80 Felter, supra note 62, at 160.
81 L. Hope O'Keeffe, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation,
and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee
Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591, 599 (1986).
82 Lewis, supra note 50, at 944.
83 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006); see also Lewis,
supra note 50, at 947.
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using an agency head to make the initial decision eliminates any
independent review.
Communications with agency heads by staff and the parties,
independently of one another, is common procedure at the FTC when
commissioners are determining whether to issue a complaint.8 4 Staff
members attempt to convince the agency heads that the case should
proceed, while the parties argue the opposite. This decision requires
the agency heads to consider the merits of the case and likelihood of
Commission success. Commissioner Rosch himself has recognized
the substantive importance of these conversations:
I think it's incumbent on [FTC heads] to require a
detailed description not only of the 'story' that will or
could be told in litigation and of the facts underlying
that story, but of the way that story will be told - i.e.,
whether it will be told principally through the
documents or statements of the respondents, through
customers or competitors, through an industry expert or
through economists . . . . Only then can we evaluate
whether a challenge would be worth the resources that
would have to be spent.
Typically, these ex parte communications between the
commissioners and the parties are less of a concern because the
administrative trial will be overseen by an independent ALJ.86 But
when an agency head who has engaged in detailed communications
with the parties is subsequently appointed ALJ, those discussions
retroactively become inappropriate ex parte communications. This
risks the AL's impartiality, or at the very least, creates the
appearance of impropriety. In the Inova matter, the fact that
84 See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
85 J. Thomas Rosch, A Peek Inside: One Commissioner's Perspective on the
Commission's Roles as Prosecutor and Judge, Remarks at the NERA 2008
Antitrust & Trade Regulation Seminar (July 3, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080703nera.pdf, at 8-9.
86 Federal Trade Commission, supra text accompanying note 20.
8 1 Id.; see also Respondent's Motion to Recuse Commissioner J. Thomas
Rosch as Administrative Law Judge, 2, In re Inova Health Sys. Found. (FTC
dismissed June 17, 2008) (No. 9326), available at
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Commissioner Rosch abstained from participating in the Commission
vote to issue the complaint88 is evidence of the Commission's concern
with overtly mixing prosecutorial and adjudicative functions - that is,
of giving the appearance of impropriety and lack of judicial
independence. However, as the parties pointed out, the same
concerns are present either way: "there is no meaningful line between
the final act of voting out the complaint and participating in the
investigation until the very brink of that vote."89
In Grolier Inc. v. F. T. C.,90 the ALJ appointed by the Commission
had many connections to the case at bar. First, he had previously
served as an attorney advisor to one of the commissioners that had
been involved with investigating the matter and who had
communications with Grolier representatives." While Grolier argued
that the ALJ should recuse himself from the matter, the attorney
advisor-turned-ALJ refused to do so, alleging that he did not recall
working on the matter while serving as an attorney advisor.92 On
appeal, Grolier claimed that the ALJ had engaged in ex parte
communications in his role as attorney advisor and failure to
disqualify him violated the APA provision precluding an employee
of the agency who has engaged in investigative or prosecutory
functions in a case from serving as ALJ.93 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with Grolier and determined that the relevant APA provision was
intended to prevent agency employees (other than agency heads) who
http://ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9326/080523respmorecuseroschasalj.pdf (arguing that
Rosch's appointment creates an appearance of impropriety).
88 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC and Virginia Attorney
General Seek to Block Inova Health System Foundation's Acquisition of Prince
William Health System (May 9, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/inova.shtm.
89 See Respondent's Motion to Recuse Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch as
Administrative Law Judge, 2-3, In re Inova Health Sys. Found. (FTC dismissed
June 17, 2008) (No. 9326), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/adjprold9326/080523respmorecuseroschasalj.pdf (arguing "there is
no meaningful line between the final act of voting out the complaint and
participating in the investigation until the very brink of that vote").
90 Grolier Inc. v. F.T.C., 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 1217.
92 Id.
9 Id.
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were exposed to ex parte information during an investigation from
then serving as AU in the matter.94
In the Inova matter, Commissioner Rosch unquestionably
engaged in ex parte communications with both investigating staff and
Inova's counsel.95  Rosch's own understanding of such
communications required that they include material facts and
arguments that would be developed at trial.96 If one of Commissioner
Rosch's attorney advisors were to have been appointed ALJ and was
present during these ex parte communications, the APA would force
recusal on the attorney advisor, as the court determined in Grolier.9 7
It is logically inconsistent that Commissioner Rosch himself would
be permitted to adjudicate the matter, but his attorney advisor would
not. The concerns of judicial independence and impartiality are
present in each scenario.
Canon 2 of the Model Code would require Commissioner Rosch
to disqualify himself from serving as the adjudicator in the Inova
matter because these ex parte communications provided him with
knowledge of the facts and arguments of the case, and even if he had
not gained actual knowledge from the ex parte communications,
reasonable minds would expect that material elements of the case had
been discussed, given standard Commission procedures. 98
Additionally, Canon 1 of the Model Code calls on adjudicators to
avoid all conduct that would create a perception in reasonable minds
that the adjudicator was less than impartial.99
If ALJs, including agency head ALJs, were subject to the Model
Code, the FTC and Commissioner Rosch could have taken steps to
enable Rosch to adjudicate the matter without compromising public
confidence in the system. The FTC could have, for example,
94 Id. at 1220-21. The court also recognized that if the Commissioner himself
had been assigned ALJ, he would have been exempt from section 554(d)'s
prohibition. See id. at 1220.
95 Respondent's Motion to Recuse Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch as
Administrative Law Judge, 2, In re Inova Health Sys. Found. (FTC dismissed June
17, 2008) (No. 9326), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9326/080523respmorecuseroschasalj.pdf.
96 See Rosch, supra note 85.
9 See Grolier, 615 F.2d at 1218-21.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 68-75, 95.
99 See MODEL CODE R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
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prevented Rosch from receiving the staff recommendation memo or
meeting with the parties ex parte.
Adopting the Model Code for ALJs could have prevented the
problems that arose in the Inova case. The purpose of the Model
Code is to "promote public confidence in the integrity" of the
adjudicative system. 00 This confidence will be necessary for the
administrative state to survive with the support of the public: "The
legal system will endure only so long as members of society continue
to believe that our courts endeavor to provide untainted, unbiased
forums in which justice may be found and done." 01 An
administrative trial, as an adjudicative forum, requires the same
confidence. An ethical code of conduct for ALJs should be adopted
for all ALJs in order to maintain public confidence in the
administrative adjudicative system. The ethical loopholes available in
the APA necessitate these external ethical requirements.
CONCLUSION
As early as 1947, the Department of Justice noted that the "entire
usefulness of [an administrative] agency may be destroyed . .. if the
public loses confidence in [the] fairness" of ALJs. 102 In 1965, Former
FTC Commissioner Philip Elman said that "[i]mprovements in the
fairness of agency adjudication will not come until agency members
frankly acknowledge, and conscientiously seek to avoid, the dangers
inherent in the fusion of functions within the administrative
process." 03 In 1977, the DC Circuit observed: "[i]ndeed, such
confidence as the public and the courts have in the integrity of the
FTC and other agencies' adjudicative processes may be said to rest, in
great part on their effort and success in keeping separate
[investigative and adjudicative] functions." 04 Yet again in 1989, the
American Bar Association concluded that while the FTC should
"00 Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance ofImpropriety: Deciding When a Judge's
Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 55, 58
(2000).
101 Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 384 (W.
Va. 1995).
102 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 39 at 47.
103 Elman, supra note 34, at 655.
10 FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 567 F.2d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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continue to possess both prosecutory and adjudicative roles, it did not
do so "without some uneasiness" and recognition of the
"awkwardness" of such a process, to which the FTC should be
"sensitive.""os Given the breadth of the administrative state, and the
wide effect that FTC actions have on American consumers, 106 as well
as the persistent concern expressed by the public, agencies, and all
levels of government regarding the comingling of investigative,
prosecutory, and adjudicative functions within an agency, ALJs -
most importantly, agency head ALJs - should be required to follow
an ethical code of conduct.
10s Kirkpatrick Committee Report, Report of the American Bar Association
Section ofAntitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade
Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 122-23 (1989).
10' If the FTC is concerned about asserting control over its administrative
mandate as an expert policy-maker in antitrust law, there are other options
available that do not raise questions of legal ethics and undermine the
administrative state. Problems with the slow speed of administrative trials can be
remedied with rulemaking. Indeed, months after the first assignment of
Commissioner Rosch as ALJ occurred, the FTC took this very step. FTC 16 CFR
Parts 3 and 4 Rules of Practice, Proposed Rule, October 7, 2008, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/PO72104nprmpt3.pdf.). If ALJ lack of expertise in
antitrust law is a concern, measures could be employed to appoint experienced
antitrust attorneys to serve as the Commission's independent ALJs. See Federal
Trade Commission, Into Our 2nd Century, July 29, 2008, Rick Parker, 103-04).
Finally, if the concern is that the federal courts are applying antitrust law
incorrectly, the FTC is already empowered to exercise its administrative
adjudication authority in such a case. For example, the FTC recently initiated
adjudication over a consummated hospital merger, alleging that the merger resulted
in antitrust violations. Following an administrative trial, the Commission found the
merger did result in violations and was able to require remedial measures. See Press
Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Challenges Hospital Merger That
Allegedly Led to Anticompetitive Price Increases (Feb. 10, 2004) (available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/enh.shtm); Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission, FTC Issues Final Opinion and Order to Restore the Competition Lost
in Evanston Northwester Healthcare Corporation's Acquisition of Highland Park
Hospital (Apr. 28, 2008) (available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/04/evanston.shtm).
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